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Abstract 
Capitalism as a mode of production and a form of social organization differs from all 
hitherto existing society in that it does not rely on the preservation of traditional hierarchies 
or on direct coercion to secure its reproduction. Capitalist society coheres on the basis of 
exchange which establishes a network of interdependent relations between individuals. 
Drawing on the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, this paper engages with the apparent paradox 
of how the reproduction of class society takes the form of spontaneous exchange 
transactions between autonomous individuals. The paper further argues that the conceptual 
basis of cognition is historically and socially conditioned and highlights the unique identity 
between the structure of exchange and the conceptual mode of thinking. Finally, the paper 
demonstrates how the hidden character of social domination and ‘the secret identity’ of 
commodity form and thought form serve to systematically obscure the true origins and 
nature of fundamental social problems. The case in point is the popular topic of rising 
inequality in the United States, a direct outcome of the reproduction of class relations, the 
underlying cause of which – the deepening division of intellectual and manual labor – is 
either conveniently ignored or, worse still, glorified. 
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On the Peculiarity of Class Reproduction in the Society of Exchange and the 
Popular Subject of Rising Inequality in the United States 
 
1. Introduction 
Friedrich A. Hayek (1988) once conceived of capitalism as ‘an extended order of human 
cooperation’ arising spontaneously by human action but not by human design. This quaint 
definition has proved to be immensely fascinating not only to properly rewarded admirers of 
capitalism but also to scores of its underdogs. The reason why is not difficult to fathom. 
Capitalism as a mode of production and a form of social organization differs from all 
hitherto existing society in that it does not rely on the preservation of traditional hierarchies 
or on direct coercion to secure its reproduction. Capitalist society coheres on the basis of 
exchange which establishes a network of interdependent relations between individuals. The 
relative standing of individuals in the network of exchange relations is ultimately determined 
by their respective status vis-à-vis the process of social production. But relations of social 
domination and, thus, the class character of capitalist society remain hidden in exchange 
which appears as spontaneous intercourse between ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individuals.  
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, drawing on the seminal work of Alfred 
Sohn-Rethel on intellectual and manual labor, it examines the apparent paradox of how the 
reproduction of class society takes the form of spontaneous exchange transactions between 
autonomous individuals. Second, it revisits Sohn-Rethel’s argument that the conceptual basis 
of cognition is historically and socially conditioned; that is, in societies where social synthesis 
comes into effect through commodity exchange, the conceptual mode of thinking reflects 
the formal structure of exchange. Finally, the paper demonstrates how the hidden character 
of social domination and ‘the secret identity’ of commodity form and thought form serve to 
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systematically obscure the true origins and nature of fundamental social problems. The case 
in point is the popular topic of rising inequality in the United States (US). The paper argues 
that rising inequality can be seen as a direct outcome of the reproduction of class relations, 
the underlying cause of which – the deepening division of intellectual and manual labor – is 
either conveniently ignored or, worse still, glorified in the guise of the increasing ‘return to 
skill’ claimed by the best and the brightest. 
 
2. From the Separation of Exchange and Use Value to the Separation of Head and 
Hand 
Capitalist society coheres on the basis of exchange; that is, the multitude of agents engaged 
in private production form an assemblage by exchanging the products of private labor which 
are transformed into commodities with the same act that affirms the status of private labor 
as socially necessary – that of purchase and sale. The survival of private individuals, based on 
their ability to satisfy basic human needs, depends critically on the confirmation of their 
labor as socially useful through the purchase of its products. This relentless social logic 
applies equally to the engineer and the plumber, to the artist and the farmer.  
Commodities are objects, material or immaterial, possessing use value in terms of 
useful properties capable of satisfying human needs and exchange value so that they can be 
bought and sold, realized as value. Money provides the material for the expression of this 
(exchange) value, thereby serving as the universal equivalent of commodities. Money 
establishes between commodities a relation of equivalence and substitutability: a work of art and a 
bushel of wheat are commensurable because they can be expressed in the same monetary 
units. To that purpose money must be ‘vested with an abstractness of the highest level 
[which enables] it to serve as the equivalent to every kind of commodity that may appear on 
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the market’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 6). The value of a commodity expressed in money 
represents an abstraction, which is not thought-induced but real, regardless of the particular 
form money takes – a coin, a paper bill or an entry on a bank account. Thus, the separation 
of exchange and use value along with the double existence of exchange value as a particular 
commodity and as money constitutes the fundamental ‘real’ abstraction of commodity 
exchange of which money is the material expression.    
Commodity exchange not only links and holds together the plurality of individuals 
thereby forming a society; historically, exchange has played an essential role in the very 
creation of the individual as such. For human beings have not always been individuals; they 
once lived in herds and clans. The emergence of the ‘individual’ has been the product of 
specific social and historical circumstances with exchange itself serving as ‘a chief means of 
this individuation [Vereinzelung]’ (Marx, 1993 [1939]: 496). Two interrelated conditions 
underlay the process of individuation. The first one is the advent of private property. The 
fact of possession becomes a general law of property only within the framework of 
exchange: 
The concept of property is itself only a conceptualisation of the factual necessity of keeping use and 
exchange separated. The need to exempt from use objects entered for exchange is a simple fact of 
experience; if it is ignored exchange must cease. (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 40) 
 
The second condition is the emergence of a class of direct producers separated from the 
means of production and subsistence and the resultant commodification of labor power. 
Exchange precedes production in that the capitalist must hire workers in order for any 
production to occur. But the availability of labor power as commodity – itself a product of 
class relations that force the members of propertyless classes into the labor market – serves 
as the precondition for generalized commodity production which is the fundamental basis of 
exchange.  
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Historically, the division of head and hand preceded the advent of wage labor. Sohn-
Rethel locates the origins of this division in Ancient Egypt where a separate class of 
intellectual workers (scribes, tax officials, priests, etc.), a rough equivalent of today’s 
professional and managerial class, became responsible for the organization and execution of 
all activities surrounding the appropriation of the social surplus by the Pharaoh, such as the 
calculation and recording of tributes, debts, and movement of supplies. Hence, the original 
division of intellectual and manual labor was not demanded by the needs of production but 
arose ‘as a means of the appropriation of the products of labour by non-labourers’ (Ibid, 90).  
The emergence of private commodity production based on wage labor deepened the 
division of head and hand which increasingly functioned as a means of workers’ control. The 
advanced division of labor implemented by industrial capitalism had a micro-dimension 
epitomized in the Fordist-Taylorist disintegration of the object and the subject of production 
at firm level, and a macro-dimension marked by the emergence of an economy-wide, social 
division of labor which eventually culminated in the so-called ‘vertical disintegration’ of 
production across the globe. Thus, the historical development of capitalism has been 
characterized by a progressive division of labor, the multiple aspects of which include the 
disintegration of the labor process and a seemingly endless specialization of tasks, 
flexibilization and atomization of workers, and the spatial reshuffling of production 
activities. However, the separation of head and hand – the division of intellectual and 
manual labor – represents a key structural feature of class society, upon which any 
subsequent division of labor is founded. The mechanism of exchange, which creates a 
network of interdependent relations, provides the essential mode of integration in the 
fragmented world of divided labor, private property, socialized production, and private 
surplus appropriation. 
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 The class character of capitalist society is not directly evident in the intercourse of 
individuals acting as buyers and sellers. 
 Only the mutually independent buyer and seller face themselves in commodity production… If, therefore, 
commodity production, or one of its associated processes, is to be judged according to its own economic 
laws, we must consider each act of exchange by itself, apart from any connection with the act of exchange 
preceding it and that following it. And since sales and purchases are negotiated solely between particular 
individuals, it is not admissible to look here for relations between whole social classes (Marx, 1990 
[1867], 733). 
 
This is why, ‘[e]quality and freedom are … not only respected in exchange based on 
exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all 
equality and freedom’ (Marx, 1993 [1939], 245).  
Each individual enters the sphere of exchange as a legal person endowed with the 
same rights and obligations as everybody else. Equality of individuals originates in the fact 
that as juridical persons they are equally entitled to own property. Ownership is private and 
exclusive as the same commodity cannot be owned simultaneously by two persons in 
separate ownership. The rules of exchange are impersonal because individuals are 
constituted as persons through their ownership of things which is ‘not a relation of person 
to person but rather a relation of the socialized individual to things over which as against other 
individuals s/he possesses unique rights of use and alienation’ (Rosenthal, 1998: 61-2). In this 
context, relations of social domination manifest themselves only indirectly through the 
mutual exchange of privately contracted claims on commodities and property. Ultimately, ‘a 
society where commodity exchange forms the nexus rerum is a purely abstract set of relations 
where everything concrete is in private hands’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 19). 
  
3. The Secret Identity of Commodity Form and Thought Form  
A worthwhile inquiry into the foundations of knowledge and science in a class society 
cannot be properly accomplished without considering the historical origins and progression 
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of the division of intellectual and manual labor. One cannot build a timeless theory of 
knowledge more than one can build a timeless theory of history because the scientific 
‘standard of truth’ also emerges historically. ‘Objective truth’ has a class function partly 
because it is propagated and sustained by the effort of a class of intellectual workers. 
Historically, the development of commodity production and exchange mediated by 
money served as the precondition for an objective process of abstraction leading to the 
emergence of abstract conceptual thought. The emergence of an ‘independent’ intellect 
capable of mathematical reasoning occurred only after commodity exchange became the 
agent of social synthesis – a state first reached in Ionia in the seventh century B.C. and 
marked by the introduction and circulation of coined money (Ibid, 44).  
As noted above, the real abstraction of commodity exchange arises from the 
separation of use value and exchange value along with the ability of the latter to take on an 
independent existence in the form of money. A commodity must first possess use value in 
order to be realized as exchange value. Only afterwards can it be realized as use value (put to 
any kind of use, consumed, destroyed). The act of exchange is premised on the separation 
and mutual exclusion of exchange and use. Objects meant for exchange are exempted from 
use. Objects intended for use are not meant to be exchanged. While the action of use may be 
banished from the act of exchange, it is not banished from the mind of the exchangers. In 
fact, they may be mentally preoccupied with the properties of the commodities as use values 
while engaging in actual exchange. However, what they think is irrelevant, how they act is 
essential. The real abstraction of commodity exchange finds its natural expression in the separation of 
thought and action. ‘In exchange the action is social, the mind is private. The outcome is a 
change in the social status of the commodities as owned property’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 43). 
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The real abstraction thus arises in exchange and through exchange or rather through the 
actions of the exchangers: 
The abstraction belongs to the interrelationship of the exchanging agents and not to the agents 
themselves. For it is not the individuals who cause the social synthesis but their actions. And their 
actions do it in such a way that, at the moments it happens, the actors know nothing of it… (Ibid, 
45) 
 
This abstract and purely social physicality of exchange has no existence other than in the human mind, 
but it does not spring from the mind… This real abstraction is the arsenal from which intellectual 
labour throughout the eras of commodity exchange draws its conceptual resources. (Ibid, 57) 
 
In societies where commodity exchange forms the nexus rerum, the structure of the cognitive 
process reflects the formal structure of exchange while the conceptual elements of the 
cognitive faculty emerge as counterparts of the real abstraction of commodity exchange.1 
These elements are principles of thought common to Greek philosophy and modern science 
labeled by Kant as categories a priori. 
…[these] categories are historical by origin and social by nature. For they themselves effect the social 
synthesis on the basis of commodity production in such a way that the cognitive faculty they articulate is 
an a priori social capacity of the mind; although it bears the exact contrary appearance, that of obeying 
the principle of ego cogito. Kant was right in his belief that the basic constituents of our form of 
cognition are preformed and issue from a prior origin, but he was wrong in attributing these 
preformations to the mind itself engaged in the phantasmagorical performance of ‘transcendental 
synthesis a priori’, locatable neither in time nor in place. In a purely formal way Kant’s transcendental 
subject shows features of striking likeness to the exchange abstraction in its distillation as money… 
(Ibid, 7) 
 
Kant’s transcendental subject signifies the alienated, self-absorbed intellect endowed with the 
capacity for logical self-direction. Its cognitive arsenal consists of non-empirical thought 
abstractions and ‘pure’ concepts. These concepts are similar to money in that they are 
abstract; that is, they are paradigms of mechanistic thinking, reified rules, the existence of 
which is purely social and unrelated to anything concrete or real in a material sense: ‘This 
socialized mind of man […] is money without its material attachments, therefore immaterial 
                                                 
1 See Toscano (2008) for a discussion of different interpretations of the notion of real abstraction. 
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and no longer recognizable as money and, indeed no longer being money but the ‘pure 
intellect’ (Ibid, 130). 
The division of society and nature, and, in particular, the constitution of nature as 
physical object-world, is part and parcel of the emergence of the independent intellect which 
is oblivious to time and space, to history and nature, immersed into its ‘symbolic’ but socially 
conditioned ‘reality’. Once a full-fledged division of manual and intellectual labor has been 
established, the independent intellect can study nature without interacting with it, without 
making its ‘hands’ dirty. The great contribution of Galileo to the development of science and 
capitalism was that his mathematical and experimental method enabled the acquisition of 
knowledge of nature from sources other than manual labor. This discovery became the 
defining feature of modern science and capitalism. Because ‘[w]ith a technology dependent 
on the knowledge of the workers the capitalist mode of production would be an 
impossibility’ (Ibid, 122). This is the ultimate rationale for the need to maintain and reinforce 
the separation of learning from everyday life, of thinking and doing, of conception and 
execution, of intellectual and manual labor. 
 The abstract ‘reality’ of the pure intellect achieves its culmination in the science of 
mathematics which Sohn-Rethel aptly defines as ‘the logic of socialized thought’. 
Mathematics fulfils a fundamental function in a class society. While ordinary language falls 
short of achieving the level of abstraction that is needed to articulate an ultimate separation 
of intellectual and manual labor, mathematics represents a purely abstract, symbolic language 
devoid of any real connection with human activity. 
Mathematics cuts a deep cleft between a context of thought and human action, establishing an 
unambiguous division of head and hand in the production process. It is no exaggeration to say that one 
can measure the extent of the division of head and hand by the inroad of mathematics in any particular 




When qualitatively different subjects or events are translated into the formal language of 
mathematics as units, numbers, or symbols, they are made commensurable. Expressing 
qualitatively different things as symbols and quantities establishes between them the same 
relation of equivalence and substitutability which exchange establishes between commodities by 
equating them as values expressed in money. Thus, ‘[c]apitalism survives dialectically by 
homogenizing its intellectual patterns to the elementary, dialectical logic of monetary 
denomination’ (Micocci, 2011, 58; 2009). The result is the emergence of an ordered and 
coherent intellectual ‘reality’ where all events and processes can be expressed in symbolic 
and/or quantitative terms. In this way, the actual messy reality of things, which is 
nonteleological (that is, disorderly and incoherent from the viewpoint of the socialized, 
‘pure’ intellect), is replaced by a coherent system of intellectual constructs that mirror the 
formal structure and elements of commodity exchange. This system forms an intellectual 
continuum. History there tends to repeat itself, it becomes a series of quasi logically 
connected events which seem to unfold toward a foreseeable end. Ruptures and 
disappearances, which constitute the most serious threat to continuity, are eliminated. With 
time and space reduced to mere abstractions, history is, in turn, eliminated as history, it 
becomes a science, and even a scientific ‘system’ where the importance of comparisons 
looms large. Events that have taken place centuries apart now appear significantly similar. 
Because the similarities and differences between events and things become merely a function 
of their position in an intellectually contrived ‘order’. 
In sum, the cognitive faculty of the socialized individual represents an a priori social 
capacity of the mind which reproduces the formal structure of exchange and its real 
abstraction. The acquisition of knowledge is mediated by form abstractions, ‘pure’ concepts 
and symbolic categories in the same way in which exchange is mediated by money. Like the 
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separation of exchange and use value through the commodity form, concepts separate from 
the real things and take on an independent existence in the individual and collective social 
mind. Being no longer tied to the things they were once meant to express, concepts become 
intellectually malleable; they are thought abstractions populating the social world. They rule 
over mind and nature. 
 
4. The Popular Subject of Rising Inequality in the United States 
The significance of the above analysis can be better appreciated in light of an example. Few 
social problems in recent years have received as much attention as that of rising inequality in 
the US. A mountain of empirical evidence attests to the existence of a long-term trend of 
increase in income and wealth inequality since the 1970s. This trend is evident in both 
measures of inequality reported by the US Census Bureau on annual basis – the Gini index2 
and the shares of aggregate household income received by quintiles. The Gini index for 
households which reached a postwar low of 0.386 in 1968 has been continuously on the rise 
since the mid-1970s and fluctuated between 0.477 and 0.482 in 2011-4. Correspondingly, the 
income shares of the first three quintiles have continuously declined, the share of the fourth 
quintile has declined after 1967 and stabilized after 1997, whereas the share of the top 
quintile has increased from 43.6 percent in 1967 to 51.2 percent in 2014 (Table 1). Widely 
publicized accounts of the spectacular growth of top incomes defined as the incomes of 
those in the top 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent of the income distribution can be highly misleading 
in that they have given rise to nonsensical claims, such as ‘the decline of the 99 percent’. 
Even a cursory look at the evidence would challenge the validity of this notion by revealing 
                                                 
2 The Gini index is a summary measure of income/wealth inequality in society. It ranges between 0 and 1, 
where 0 means perfect equality (everyone has the same income/wealth) and 1 means perfect inequality (one 
person has all the income/wealth and everyone else has zero income/wealth). 
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that said decline has been limited to the bottom 80 percent. It is further important to 
emphasize that the inequality of income distribution pales in comparison with that of the 
distribution of wealth where the gulf between the top 20 and the bottom 80 percent is truly 
enormous. Between 1983 and 2010, the share of the top 20 percent in total net worth 
increased from 81.3 to 88.9 percent. Notably, both the relative shares of the top 1 percent 
and of the next 19 percent have significantly increased (Table 2). When the distribution of 
financial (non-home) wealth is considered, inequality is even more staggering. In 2010, the 
top 20 percent owned 95.6 percent of all financial wealth which constitutes an increase of 
4.3 percent since 1983. In this case, there was a minimal decline (of 0.8 percent) in the share 
of the top 1 percent relative to the share of the next 19 percent which increased from 47.5 
percent in 1983 to 53.5 percent in 2010 (Table 3). 
 
4.1. The Dominant View 
The mainstream debate on the causes of rising inequality has been to a significant extent 
dominated by a neoliberal/neoclassical account centered on the so-called rising premium to 
education in the context of skill-biased technological change (SBTC). This account 
emphasizes the interplay between the supply and demand for highly skilled workers in 
relation to technological change. On the one hand, it is asserted that SBTC has induced a 
growing demand for skills as a result of which the return to skills (or the skill premium), as 
measured by the relative wages of college graduates to high school graduates, has shown a 
tendency to increase (e.g. Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 
1994). On the other hand, it is argued that the growing supply of skills has stimulated the 
development of complementary technology which in turn has further increased the demand 
for skills (e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Goldin & Katz, 1998). Further explanations for rising wage 
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inequality point to various effects of globalization (e.g. Borjas et al., 1997; Feenstra & 
Gordon, 2001; Haskel et al., 2012) and changes in labor market institutions, such as the 
decline of the real value of the minimum wage and the diminished role of unions (e.g. Lee, 
1999; Jacobs & Myers, 2014; Western & Rosenfeld, 2014). Another account attributes rising 
inequality to the excessive growth of top incomes. This perspective is intensely preoccupied 
with the fortunes of the top 1 percent and espouses the belief that rising inequality can be 
remedied with a reform of the system of taxes and transfers (e.g. Piketty, 2014; Saez, 2006). 
All these accounts share one common feature: they seek to determine the nature and causes 
of inequality through measurement via advanced statistical and formal methods. The correct 
measurement shall establish the scientific foundation on the basis of which all related factors 
including causes and solutions will be objectively revealed. In addition to the heavy reliance 
on data aggregation and statistical analysis, neoclassical studies often construct models to 
analyze the mechanics of the problem. All these accounts are thus excessively ‘scientific’ 
being the product of ‘the methodical operation of the human mind in its socialized form, 
guided by its specific logic, which is mathematics’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 130).  
The neoliberal/neoclassical emphasis on educational attainment and the ‘rising skill 
premium’ is of particular interest for the present analysis. This perspective acknowledges that 
deepening inequality is linked to changes in the wage structure resulting from the so-called 
polarization of the occupational structure.3 Following Autor’s (2010) presentation, while 
during the 1980s there was an almost uniform rise in different employment categories and 
skill levels with occupations below the median skill level actually declining and occupations 
above the median increasing as a share of employment, the transformation of the 
occupational structure over the 1990s was characterized by the disproportionate expansion 
                                                 
3 One of the problems with this argument concerns its inability to account for the rise of intra-occupational 
wage inequality (see Kim & Sakamoto, 2008; Wysong & Perrucci, 2007). 
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of job opportunities in both high-skill/pay occupations and low-skill/pay occupations, 
coupled with shrinking opportunities in middle-skill/pay white-collar and blue-collar 
occupations. These changes in the occupational structure are attributed to the growing 
demand for highly educated and skilled workers driven by SBTC, largely associated with the 
computerization of the workplace (e.g. Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Berman, Bound, and 
Griliches, 1994). This account was particularly popular in the 1990s when a more convincing 
case could be made that it was at least superficially consistent with the facts.4 However, a 
large and growing body of literature still continues to operate on the assumption that the 
demand for skills driven by SBTC has continued unabated in blissful ignorance of the 
evidence that said demand has actually been declining since 2000 (Beaudry, Green & Sand, 
2013). 
The claim that technological change is positively skill-biased is highly controversial in 
light of the evidence, historical and most recent alike. Supporters of the SBTC hypothesis 
readily admit that this phenomenon did not exist in the nineteenth century when the artisan 
shop was first replaced by the factory and later by interchangeable parts and the assembly 
line. Consequently, products previously manufactured by skilled artisans started to be 
produced by low-skill factory workers. Allegedly, the big difference between then and now is 
that in the nineteenth century manufacturing technology and skill were substitutes whereas 
in the twentieth century they became complements (e.g. Goldin & Katz, 1998). According to 
Acemoglu (2002, 9), technological changes over the last century have been skill-biased 
because ‘the rapid increase in the supply of skilled workers has induced the development of 
skill-complementary technologies’. And yet since the early 2000s the growing supply of skills 
                                                 
4 The assertion that technologically-driven demand for skills has been the main determinant of rising inequality 
has faced significant challenges even from a neoclassical perspective. Lemieux (2008) offers an overview of the 
literature pointing to the multiple problems with that argument (see also Galbraith, 1998).  
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has coexisted with the proliferation of low-skill jobs in the US economy and thus with the 
deepening inequality of income and wealth. This reality poses a challenge that the SBTC 
view has been unable to master. I shall return to this important point later. 
Despite its scientific garb, the ‘skill premium’ argument is ideologically charged as it 
indirectly seeks to justify the polarization of the wage structure on ‘meritocratic’ grounds. 
The emphasis on educational attainment represents in essence a ‘scientific’ restatement of 
the conservative view linking individual success or failure (i.e. the ability to earn high or low 
pay) to the individual choice and determination to acquire marketable skills. Naturally, the 
proponents of the skill premium argument seem unaware of the ideological bias of their 
‘value-free’ methodology. Regardless of the fact that they themselves construct the models 
used to prove the existence of skill premium, they end up looking at these models as the 
reality itself.   
In what follows, I outline an alternative explanation for rising inequality in the US 
which is seen as a consequence of the deepening polarization of the class structure and the 
progressive division of intellectual and manual labor. It should be acknowledged that these 
processes are themselves the result of the structural transformation of the US economy and 
its evolving position within the global division of labor – a topic which is beyond the scope 
of the present analysis. 
 
4.2. A Very Brief Excursion into the History of Class 
During the nineteenth century, foreign travelers were often impressed with what Alexis de 
Tocqueville described as the remarkable ‘equality of conditions’ characteristic of American 
society.5 Various inequalities of wealth and power appeared less pronounced compared to 
                                                 
5 Those accounts were apparently oblivious of the existence of slavery. 
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the European countries. For the most part of the nineteenth century, even the denial of the 
existence of ‘fixed classes’ in the US was not uncommon. Wage labor was considered an ‘un-
American’ institution, while the notion of laboring or wage classes appeared ‘distasteful to 
many true-hearted Americans’ (Quoted in Lasch, 1994, 62). This conception of classless 
society extended beyond the absence of hereditary privileges and had at its root the 
abolishment of the division between intellectual and manual labor. As noted by Lasch (1994, 
64), 
The concept of a laboring class was objectionable to Americans because it implied not only the 
institutionalization of wage labor but the abandonment of what many of them took to be the central 
promise of American life: the democratization of intelligence. 
 
However, by 1890 when the Census Bureau announced the closing of the frontier of 
settlement, a permanent class of hirelings was firmly established, while the term ‘social 
mobility’ was gaining currency. The rise of the opportunity to rise in the social scale became 
a substitute for the democratization of intelligence effectively ending the prospects for the 
latter. Institutionalized education cut a deep cleft between the thinking and the laboring 
classes in the same way in which Fordism-Taylorism separated conception from execution. 
For the purpose of the highly stratified educational system is not to enlighten the masses by 
raising them to common intellectual standards but to serve as a recruitment mechanism for 
elites. 
According to what has been widely considered the first comprehensive study of 
social stratification in a small community in the US, conducted by Robert and Helen Lynd, 
in mid-1920s’ Middletown (Muncie, Indiana, the community under study), there were two 
classes – a working class and a business class (i.e. middle class) – which accounted for, 
respectively, 71 and 29 percent of the town’s population. The working class consisted of 
those who earned their living addressing their activities ‘primarily to things, utilizing material 
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things in the making of things and performance of services, while the members of the 
second group address their activities primarily to people in the selling or promotion of 
things, services, and ideas’ (Lynd & Lynd, 1929, 22). The business class also included highly 
skilled professionals, such as architects, surgeons and chemists, amounting to 4 out of the 29 
percent. Notably, Lynd & Lynd’s definition of the middle class overlaps with R.H. Gretton’s 
definition, according to which the middle class is ‘that portion of the community to which 
money is the primary condition and the primary instrument of life’ (Gretton, 1917, 8). 
Gretton’s middle class includes ‘the merchant, in the broadest sense of that word, and the 
capitalist manufacturer’ along with the learned professional class which also uses of money 
as the primary instrument of life. Thus, the common feature of middle-class activities is their 
‘abstract’ character. 
According to Lynd & Lynd (1929), Middletown in the 1920s did not have an upper 
class, only a lower (working) and a middle (business) class as the 8 or 9 households who 
could be conceived of as belonging to an upper class did not form a group apart but were 
merged into the middle class. By the mid-1930s, when the same authors revisited the town, 
this situation had dramatically changed. The so-called ‘X family’ – a wealthy family of 
manufacturers whose local position since 1925 had become hereditary with the emergence of 
the second generation of sons – had established a significant degree of control over industry, 
banking, real estate, government, schools, churches, and philanthropy in Middletown. As 
Lynd & Lynd (1937, 77) observe, 
If […] one views the Middletown pattern as simply concentrating and personalizing the type of 
control which control of capital gives to the business group in our culture, the Middletown-situation 
may be viewed as epitomizing the American business-class control system. It may even foreshadow a 
pattern which may become increasingly prevalent in the future as the American propertied class 
strives to preserve its control. 
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During the three postwar decades, US capitalism seemed to have experienced a reversal in 
the pattern of growing business-class control, as a result of which American society recorded 
some of the lowest levels of income inequality in its history. The mass-production-mass-
consumption Fordist capitalism invented its own version of the ‘middle class’ as an 
ideological device meant to promote working-class consumerism. Working-class households 
were elevated to ‘middle-class’ status based on the ability to purchase a single-family 
residence, two cars, and, ideally, college education for the children. Since the 1980s, that 
middle class has experienced rapid decline. If we define the middle class to include all 
households receiving between 75 and 125 percent of median income, then the size of the US 
middle class in 1995 stood at 27.3 percent of all households compared to 43.9 percent for 
Germany’s and 52.7 percent for Sweden’s middle class (Kerbo, 2012, 212). Progressive 
authors love to deplore the disappearance of the Fordist middle class. According to 
Galbraith (1998, 4), the growing gap between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs ‘is leading toward the 
transformation of the United States from a middle-class democracy into something that 
more closely resembles an authoritarian quasi democracy, with an overclass, an underclass, 
and a hidden politics driven by money’. However, the postwar Fordist republic of citizens-
consumers was as far away from a middle-class democracy as it could possibly be; for the 
prospects for the latter effectively died around the time the frontier was closed. The 
democratization of consumption was a poor substitute for the democratization of 
intelligence. The Fordist ‘middle class’ is indeed on its way out as the economic rationale for 
its existence is no longer there. But the middle class proper is alive and well and getting 
richer in symbiosis with the upper class. 
Income inequality is not a product of ill-conceived policies but an inherent feature of 
capitalism whose ultimate root lies in the fact that a tiny minority (roughly equal to the 
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recently much talked about top 1 percent) owns the bulk of the productive and financial 
assets and, consequently, appropriates a disproportionate amount of the social product or 
national income in mainstream parlance. In this context, any suggestion that the incomes 
and/or fortunes of the propertied and propertyless classes could or should rise at a similar 
pace amounts to sheer nonsense. The top 1 percent (the upper class, the capitalist class 
proper) has very limited direct involvement in the process of social production and surplus 
appropriation on the top of an even more limited involvement with anything concerning the 
lower class and with the lower class itself. Any interaction between the tiny upper class and 
the huge lower class is mediated by the appropriately named ‘middle class’, the next 18-19 
percent. The defining feature of this middle class, whose birth preceded capitalism dating 
back to the ancient societies of appropriation, is its position as functional intermediary 
between the upper and the lower class in the process of social production and surplus 
appropriation. That class of managerial and professional workers (‘the credentialed class’) 
engaged in the maintenance and reproduction of the status-quo constitutes the ‘next’ 18-19 
percent (Wysong & Perruci, 2007). The middle class may have changed its name but not its 
character. As Gretton (1919, 5) observes, 
what the people of the Middle Class are now, they have always been. Soundly educated, cosmopolitan 
in outlook, well-knit into the body politic, and capable in their own affairs as they are at present, they 
are regarded as possessing all those qualities in the past (though, of course, in different degree), and as 
exercising them upon policy. 
 
4.3. The Rise of the Symbolic Analysts and the Resurgent Division of Intellectual and 
Manual Labor 
The growing gap between good and bad jobs is a product of the deepening division of 
intellectual and manual labor, clearly visible in the economy-wide changes that have been 
underway since the 1970s. By the early 1990s, the vestiges of the Fordist ‘middle-class’, mass 
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production-mass consumption economy were largely shaken off and the foundations of a 
differently stratified economy of divided labor were firmly established. Robert Reich’s (1992) 
singular ode to the rise of the symbolic analyst is a case in point. Reich’s vision is valuable 
for the present analysis in that it demonstrates how the inexorable separation of head and 
hand, of intellectual and manual labor, governs and shapes the way in which reality is seen 
and represented.  
According to Reich (1992), the bulk of American jobs can be divided into three 
categories: routine production services, in-person services and symbolic-analytic services. 
Routine production services involve a wide variety of occupational functions unified by the 
performance of repetitive tasks. This includes not only blue-collar workers in the traditional 
industries but also their supervisors – low- and middle-level managers. Routine jobs are also 
amply represented in the high-tech industries where huge piles of raw data must be 
processed in the same monotonous way as assembly-line work. Even professionals, such as 
lawyers and accountants, would fall under that category if their work involves mainly 
repetitive tasks, such as ‘cranking out the same old wills, contracts, and divorces, over and 
over, with only the names changed (Ibid, 181). The second functional category – in-person 
services – is similar to routine work in that it also involves simple, repetitive tasks; the pay 
for such services is a function of the hours worked or the amount of work performed as in 
the case of routine work. The material difference is that such services must be provided 
person-to-person and are not tradable. Work in both categories requires no analytical or 
problem-solving skills. Thus, ‘a standard American education, based on the traditional 
premises of American education’ (Ibid, 175) is sufficient to prepare routine workers and in-
person servers for their lifetime of service. 
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 The third functional category is that of the symbolic analysts who ‘solve, identify and 
broker problems by manipulating symbols’, such as words, data, models, oral and visual 
presentations (Ibid, 177-8). Some of these manipulations may produce more efficient 
resource and asset allocation, inventions and innovations, or entertainment for an audience. 
Traditional American education is utterly inadequate for the cultivation of symbolic-analytic 
talent. Only a select segment of the higher education system can provide the superior 
training needed by the best and brightest on the way to their symbolic-analytic futures: 
… our best schools and universities are providing a small subset of America’s young with excellent 
basic training in the techniques essential to symbolic analysis. When supplemented by interested and 
engaged parents, good health care, visits to museums and symphonies, occasional foreign travel, home 
computers, books and all the other cultural and educational paraphernalia that symbolic-analytic 
parents are delighted to shower on their progeny, the education of this fortunate minority is an 
exceptionally good preparation for the world that awaits. (Ibid, 233) 
 
Concurrently with the rise of the symbolic analysts from the mid-1980s onward, 
standardized test scores – a symbolic-analytic innovation par excellence – became the key 
instrument for sorting high school graduates according to ‘meritocratic’ rules. Access to the 
most selective parts of the ‘meritocratic’ higher education system became conditional 
primarily upon the achievement of high scores on standardized tests. This deepened and 
reinforced the stratification of the higher education system as not only the applicants but 
also the institutions themselves became subject to ranking on the basis of standardized test 
scores (Alon, 2009). 
The rise of the symbolic analyst is not only coincidental but largely identical with the 
previously discussed polarization of the occupational structure which became apparent in the 
late 1980s and dramatically intensified in the 1990s. The said polarization is just another 
name for the widening gap between intellectual and manual labor. Reich captures with 
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remarkable precision the highly specific nature and purpose of the members of the symbolic 
credentialed class: 
They simplify reality into abstract images that can be rearranged, juggled, experimented with, 
communicated to other specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into reality. The 
manipulations are done with analytic tools, sharpened by experience. The tools may be mathematical 
algorithms, legal arguments, financial gimmicks, scientific principles, psychological insights… (Ibid, 
178) 
 
Through the inroads of mathematics and symbolic categories, the language and operation of 
the symbolic class are far removed from the reality of everyday life. The cleft between 
thought and action, thinking and doing, conception and execution widens to the extreme. 
Reich’s book is remarkable in many ways. For one, it is peculiar as an unbridled 
exaltation of class rule delivered by the then soon-to-be Secretary of Labor in the Clinton 
administration. Reich puts his finger on some of the most pernicious features of the 
American class society without the slightest shadow of realization that something might be 
wrong with the picture he paints. Being a symbolic analyst himself, his mind seems to 
wander a parallel reality. As Lasch (1994, 38-9) observes, 
Only in a world in which words and images bear less and less resemblance to the things they appear to 
describe would it be possible for a man like Reich to refer to himself, without irony, as secretary of 
labor or to write so glowingly of a society governed by the best and brightest.  
 
Unlike neoliberal writers who seek to justify laissez-faire capitalism by evoking trickle-down 
effects, Reich has no shame admitting that the rising tide does not and will not lift all boats. 
In particular, the boats of the routine production workers and in-person servers are sinking, 
albeit not at the same speed, while the vessel of the symbolic analysts is rising. It is clear 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the rising fortunes of the elite minority thrive alongside the 
sinking prospects of the losing majority in the brave new world of work. But how could they 
co-exist so peacefully?  
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… the secession of symbolic analysts from the rest of America has proceeded calmly and quietly. The 
four-fifths of the population whose economic future is growing more precarious has not vociferously 
contested the disengagement of the one fifth whose economic future is becoming brighter. (Ibid, 282) 
 
Reich attributes the reasons for the acquiescence of the bottom 80 percent to a combination 
of their political passivity along with the recognition that they ‘depend upon how and where 
symbolic analysts decide to dedicate their energies and money’ (Ibid, 294). 
At present, Reich (2014) denounces the accumulation of vast fortunes by the top 
0.01 percent after having condemned rising income inequality in multiple books. It does not 
seem to occur to him that this state of affairs may be the natural outcome of the rule of the 
best and brightest, selected, nurtured, and employed in the ways he described with such 
sickening fascination in his 1992 book.  
 
4.4. Making Sense of the Reversal in the Demand for Skills and the Growth of the Low-
Wage Economy 
The growth in high-skill/pay, symbolic-analytic occupations that inspired the progenitors of 
the ‘new economy’ did not continue in the 2000s. Employment growth in 1999-2007 was 
heavily concentrated among the lowest three deciles of occupations. In deciles four through 
nine, employment shares actually declined while in the highest decile of occupations, 
employment shares remained flat. There was no relative growth in the top 20 percent of the 
occupational skill distribution between 1999 and 2007, and only a modest recovery between 
2007 and 2012 (Autor, 2010; 2014). During the Great Recession job losses in higher-wage 
and mid-wage occupations exceeded those in lower-wage occupations whereas job creation 
during the recovery was disproportionately concentrated in lower-wage occupations. Thus, 
44 percent of job gains between February 2010 and February 2014 were in lower-wage 
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industries versus 26 and 30 percent in mid-wage and higher-wage industries (National 
Employment Law Project, 2014).  
Considering that recent employment gains have been disproportionately 
concentrated at the very bottom of the skill/pay distribution, it is hardly justifiable to speak 
any more of labor market polarization defined as the simultaneous growth of high-skill/pay 
and low-skill/pay jobs. In actuality, the share of high-skill/pay jobs has not only stabilized 
but declined while the share of low-skill/pay jobs is still expanding. Furthermore, there is no 
shortage of evidence that the overall falloff of job quality has taken place despite a sustained 
rise of educational attainment and skills along with an increase of the productivity of the 
average US worker (e.g. Beaudry, Green & Sand, 2013; 2014; Schmitt & Jones, 2012). 
However, even authors who lament the decline of ‘good jobs’ as a key factor behind rising 
income inequality often seem to neglect the fact that the underlying cause for the 
transformation of the occupational and wage structure is the changing structure of the US 
economy. This neglect gives rise to heart-warming appeals to turn ‘bad jobs’ into good ones 
by endowing them with health benefits and retirement plans in addition to bettering their 
pay (Schmitt & Jones, 2013). Apart from the fact that such appeals are no more realistic than 
the famous wealth tax of Thomas Piketty, they seem to miss the crux of the matter. A ‘bad 
job’ with benefits is not tantamount to a ‘good job’, and it certainly makes no economic 
sense to pay a ‘good wage’ for a ‘bad job’. While the link between skill content and pay may 
not be as straightforward as mainstream economic theory would like us to believe, the 
defining feature of a bad job is not simply its pay but its content. Such jobs typically involve 
manual production work or in-person services. Most of them have low skill content and 
require a very limited involvement of the cognitive faculty. They represent ‘manual’ labor 
writ large. 
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How can we explain the slowdown in the rate of growth of high-skilled symbolic-
analytic occupations and the decline of their share in total employment since 2000, which 
happens to be the year symbolically associated with the Tech Bust? As Beaudry, Green & 
Sand (2013; 2014) document, the reversal in the demand for skills and cognitive tasks has 
taken place despite a sustained rise in educational attainment as measured by the growing 
numbers of college graduates. This has led to a de-skilling process in the course of which 
highly educated workers have moved down the occupational ladder and begun to seek 
employment in occupations traditionally performed by lower-skilled workers, thereby 
pushing low-skilled workers further down the occupational ladder and occasionally even out 
of the labor force. Thus, ‘having a college degree is only partly about obtaining access to 
high-paying managerial and technology jobs since it is also about beating out less educated 
workers for barista and clerical job type jobs’ (Beaudry, Green & Sand, 2013, 3). Notably, 
employment growth in cognitive task-intensive occupations has declined simultaneously with 
computer investment as the almost 40-percent increase in equipment and software 
investment as a share of GDP over the 1980s and 1990s was followed by a reversal and 
decline after 2000 which brought this share back to the levels of the mid-1970s. In light of 
this evidence, the same authors hypothesize that the introduction of a new technology 
generates demand for managerial and problem-solving skills during an adoption period, 
while the technology is installed, adapted, mastered and routinized, after which the demand 
for skills slows down concurrently with capital investment as the adaptation challenges are 
superseded by the less demanding tasks of operation and maintenance. 
This account is consistent with the view taken here, according to which the core 
purpose of technology, in general, and of the automation of the production process, in 
particular, has been to make production independent of the knowledge and skills of the 
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workers. The introduction of machinery in the production process, from its earliest stages 
during the Industrial Revolution to its most advanced contemporary forms of 
computerization and automation, has been driven not only and not primarily by the desire to 
increase efficiency and lower production cost but by the need to achiever a higher level of 
control over the labor process and the workers: ‘The postulate of automatism as a condition 
for the capital control over production is even more vital than its economic profitability’ 
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 122). The difference between the early automation and present day 
computerization is not qualitative, but quantitative; that is, is just a matter of degree. The 
development of an automatic system of machinery objectifies the separation of head and 
hand as such a system, once designed and implemented by a relatively small group of high-
skilled workers, can be maintained and operated by a large majority of low-skilled workers. 
Hence, the automation of production naturally entails the progressive de-skilling of the labor 
force. Consequently, technological change is not positively skill-biased, except for the 
relatively short period between the adoption of new technology and its routinization. The 
last such period from about the mid-1980 until 2000 was marked by a simultaneous surge of 
computer investment and the relative demand for skilled labor which have, in the meantime, 
concurrently tailed off. 
The deepening division of labor under capitalism inevitably leads to the expansion of 
the volume of manual and/or routine work along with a large and growing class of manual 
workers. Computerization and automation are governed by the same underlying principles as 
the Fordist-Taylorist production process. There is no qualitative break between the assembly 
line and the computer; they represent different levels of automation. Both 
computerization/automation and the Fordist-Taylorist production process entail the 
disintegration of complex, composite tasks/processes into simple tasks that need repeated 
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performance. These tasks represent manual and/or routine work in that they do not require 
any significant degree of conscious application of the cognitive faculty. Arguably, 
computerization and automation cause the displacement of some workers performing 
routine tasks. But there are likely limits to this process due to the existence of tasks and 
functions that machines cannot perform (Autor, 2014). Importantly, the automation of some 
areas goes along with the progressive routinization of others. In the course of the 
progressive division of labor, more and more complex human activities that once had an 
intellectual or creative component are being reconstituted as series of simple tasks and 
thereby transformed into routine work whose performance requires neither brain nor skill. 
The limits to automation do not set limits to the de-humanization of work. 
In sum, the proliferation of bad jobs at the bottom and the spectacular income 
growth at the top are inextricably linked. Their simultaneous occurrence attests to the 
deepening polarization of the US class structure and the correspondent deepening division 
of intellectual and manual labor, which constitutes the material foundation for the diverging 
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Table 1 
Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Households 
Shares of aggregate income 












2014 124,586 3.1 8.2 14.3 23.2 51.2 21.9 
2007 116,783 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 21.2 
1997 102,528 3.6 8.9 15.0 23.2 49.4 21.7 
1987 91,124 3.8 9.6 16.1 24.3 46.2 18.2 
1977 76,030 4.2 10.2 16.9 24.7 44.0 16.8 
1967 60,813 4.0 10.8 17.3 24.2 43.6 17.2 
 
















Table 2  
Distribution of net worth in the United States, 1983–2010 
 
Source: Wolff, 2012 
 
Table 3 
Distribution of financial (non-home) wealth in the United States, 1983–2010 
 
 
Source: Wolff, 2012 
 
 
 Top 1 percent Next 19 percent Bottom 80 percent 
1983 33.8% 47.5% 18.7% 
2010 35.4% 53.5% 11.1% 
 Top 1 percent Next 19 percent Bottom 80 percent 
1983  42.9% 48.4% 8.7% 
2010  42.1% 53.5% 4.7% 
